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## Talking Points for the ADDI

4 November 1985

### The Libyan Threat to US Interests

#### Libya Under Qadhafi

Qadhafi's continued hold on power almost certainly would result in an increased Libyan threat to US interests worldwide.

- Qadhafi regards US influence as the principal impediment to achieving his revolutionary aims and leadership ambitions in the Third World.
- Qadhafi is likely to continue ongoing efforts to undermine pro-US regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Chad, Sudan and Zaire. These efforts include targeting various heads of state for assassination.
- Qadhafi also probably will step up Libyan activities in Latin America, an area he refers to as the US "backyard."
- He already is promoting a militant, anti-US posture among traditionally non-violent English-speaking leftists in the Caribbean and maintains ties to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, a recipient of [redacted] Libyan economic assistance over the past several years.
- We anticipate continued efforts to build ties with radicals inside the US whom he hopes to use in plots to kill Libyan dissidents residing here.
- Qadhafi's traditional reluctance to target directly US personnel and facilities will diminish, particularly in light of the recent public allegation of CIA support to Libyan dissidents. [redacted]
- Evidence that Qadhafi is less fearful than in the past of US military retaliation for terrorist deeds includes five major speeches this year by Qadhafi and his principal lieutenant, Abd al-Salam Jallud, extolling the use of terrorism against the US in Lebanon and pointing to what they regard as the inefficacy of US military strength in preventing those incidents.

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A Post-Qadhafi Libya

Any post-Qadhafi government that does not include radical revolutionary members would be less willing to target US interests directly.

- Such a regime probably would curtail worldwide support for revolutionary causes and seek a more constructive relationship with Washington.
- Even a new regime dominated by the Qadhafi clan would need to revise economic priorities to ease domestic unrest and probably would adopt foreign policies to facilitate access to Western consumer goods, technology, and managerial expertise.

At the same time, Qadhafi's references to Libya's brutal colonization by Western powers in the early 20th century and his 16-year attack on Western values ensures that no new leadership could survive without demonstrating its independence from Western influence.

- A successor regime, even one comprising moderate Libyan exiles, would have to dispel inevitable suspicions at home and abroad that the US had put it in power.
- As a result, we would expect a post-Qadhafi regime to remain opposed to many US policies and stay involved in areas of traditional Libyan interest, such as Tunisia, Niger, Sudan, and Chad.

We do not believe that the Soviet Union currently has the assets in Libya to ensure a marxist-oriented successor to Qadhafi. Soviet advisors are too few and scattered to take control of the Libyan military

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- Moscow would try to use its role as principal supplier of military weaponry to exploit the political turmoil in a post-Qadhafi Libya and to develop a reliable pro-Soviet faction in the armed forces.
- Moscow also could use its access to Libyan military personnel and facilities to warn the new Libyan regime of the plotting coup if the Soviets deemed a change in government against their interests.

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